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PLEADING FOR PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE IN THE COURTS
CHARLES H. BARoN*

By the time this article is published, the United States Supreme
Court will likely have rendered its decisions in Vacca v. Quil/1 and
Washington v. Glucksberg. 2 Many predict that those decisions will
reverse the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second
Circuits and will reinstate the New York and Washington assisted
suicide statutes which those courts had held unconstitutional under
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Some observers suggest that such a result will con
firm the view that the question of whether and how physician-as
sisted suicide is to be legalized should be left exclusively to state
legislatures and that courts, in particular, have no proper role to
play with respect to this issue. This is a mistaken view which rests
upon a simplistic notion of the roles played by the various branches
of government in the American law-making process.
Courts and legislatures each have their strengths and weak
nesses as law-making bodies. Indeed, the very qualities that consti
tute their respective strengths often constitute their respective
weaknesses as well. For example, it is both an advantage and a dis
advantage of court-made common law that it cannot rely for its va
lidity upon a vote by the people's elected representatives. Judges
who make law must, in support of their adopted principles, demon
strate a better justification than mere majority approval of the out
come of the case. Moreover, since judge-made law, unlike
legislation, applies retroactively, the court must convince the reader
that its rule of law is so reasonable that it can, with justice, be ap
plied after the fact.
Another strength and weakness of judge-made law is that it is
made in the context of individual cases. This restricts the generality
• Professor of law, Boston College Law School; A.B., University of Penn
sylvania; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania.
1. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997).
2. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
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of the rules that are developed, and requires law-making to await
the development of cases that force courts to make law as part of
the dispute resolution process. Case by case law-making also
means that the judge makes law in a context which forces upon him
a close acquaintance with the consequences of his action. Whereas
the legislator is like the B-52 pilot who drops his bombs on the Me
kong Delta and returns to a meal at his base in Japan, the judge is
like the dog soldier who must look the enemy in the eye before he
shoots him. The judge fashions the law in order to do justice in the
case before him. The common law doctrine which develops out of
this process attempts to generalize case law principles which lay
claim to having produced the just result in each case. Conveniently,
when such principles are later found unjust, they can be distin
guished or overruled. Certainly many judges, lawyers, and com
mentators have come to think of the common law development
process as one in which the "law work[s] itself pure from case to
case."3 Sometimes, they have had difficulty accepting the incursion
of seemingly arbitrary legislation into the law-making process.
Where the legislation has seemed extraordinarily unjust, courts
have sometimes declared it to be in violation of "fundamental
law"-even where there were no written constitutions to supply
such fundamental law. For example, Lord Coke's action in Bon
ham's Case,4 struck down an act of Parliament on the ground that a
law "against common right and reason" is void.
Of course, legislative law-making has its virtues. The legisla
tor, unlike the judge, need not wait for a dispute to arise before
making law, and the law that is made can be as general in applica
tion and as detailed as the law maker wishes it to be. Additionally,
the legislator need not restrict his decision-making to the available
evidence which has been produced in a court of law by parties to a
case. He can hear from any person or group that is interested in the
outcome of his deliberations, and the law he ultimately produces
can precisely accommodate whatever compromises have been
struck between contending interest groups-it need be justified on
no other basis than the fact that a majority has voted for it. Finally,
the process of direct election of legislators is intended to provide
the electorate with an opportunity to be ruled by the laws they re
ally want rather than the laws that judges have chosen for them. In
Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
L. REv. 630, 636 (1958).
4. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUcnON TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 241 (3d ed.
1990) for a discussion of this case.
3.
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theory at least, the legislator who does not vote for the laws that the
voters want will be removed from office at the next election.
Both courts and legislatures have played important roles in the
development of contemporary American law regarding the "right
to die," but many of the most significant first steps were taken by
the courts. When, in 1975, Joseph Quinlan approached his daugh
ter Karen's physicians with a request that she be taken off artificial
life-support so as to allow her to die with dignity, the physicians
were quite understandably concerned that they might expose them
selves to criminal prosecution if they acceded to the request. Long
standing New Jersey statutes regarding both homicide5 and "Aiding
Suicide"6 seemed potentially applicable to physicians who, by re
moving a ventilator from a patient, knowingly allowed the patient
to die-even when that patient was in a persistent vegetative state.
Mr. Quinlan and Karen's physicians might have approached the
legislature and asked that these statutes be amended to create ex
ceptions for cases like Karen Quinlan's. Had they done so, it is
doubtful that the request would have been granted. New Jersey
legislators would properly have feared that such amendments
would have had the potential for legalizing much more than the
removal of ventilators in cases like Karen Quinlan's. Legislation is
written in sweepingly general terms and does not arise within the
limiting context of the facts of a particular dispute. Moreover, New
Jersey legislators would likely have been wary of the political conse
quences of voting for legislation that openly legalized certain acts of
physician homicide and assisted suicide. Unless legislators were
sure that the measure was popular, and that it did not have numer
ous opponents among the electorate who would be more willing
than its proponents to reelect legislators on the basis of where they
stood on that measure alone, the legislature would probably have
refused to act.
Instead of applying to the legislature, Mr. Quinlan applied to
the New Jersey courts. The courts ultimately granted the relief he
requested. Despite the fact that the New Jersey Attorney General
and the Morris County Prosecutor took the position that causing
the death of Karen Quinlan by removing her from a ventilator
would be a criminal act of homicide or aiding suicide, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey determined that the act could be performed
without fear of prosecution. Concluding that Karen Quinlan's
5. See N.J.
6. See N.J.

STAT.
STAT.

ANN. §§ 2A:113-1, -2, -5 (West 1985) (repealed 1979).
ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1985).
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"right to privacy" under both the New Jersey State Constitution
and the United States Constitution protected a decision to die with
dignity rather than be maintained in a persistent vegetative state,
the court decided that the State's countervailing interest in "the
preservation and sanctity of human life" did not outweigh Karen's
right on the facts of her case. "We have no hesitancy in deciding [in
the instant case]," said the court, "that no external compelling inter
est of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable,
only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibil
ity of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life."7
Clearly, the court was moved by the plight of Karen Quinlan and.
her family, and was convinced that the law should permit them the
relief they requested despite the lack of legislative sanction. The
court was also moved to act by a desire to assist the medical profes
sion. "[T]here must be a way," the court said, "to free physicians,
in the pursuit of their healing vocation, from possible contamina
tion by self-interest or self-protection concerns which would inhibit
their independent medical judgments for the well-being of their dy
ing patients."8 Toward that end, the court laid down a procedure.
for insulating physicians from liability in cases like. Karen's in the
future. Where the family, guardian, and physician of a patient in a
permanent vegetative state agreed that the patient should be taken
off life support, and a hospital "Ethics Committee" agreed that
there was no reasonable possibility of the patient returning to a
cognitive, sapient state, the life support could be withdrawn "with
out any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any partici
pant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others."9
In the following year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu
setts rendered a decision that built upon the doctrinal base laid in
Quinlan. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
SaikewicZ,10 the Supreme Judicial Court granted relief to physicians
at a state institution for the mentally retarded who sought permis
sion to withhold from a profoundly retarded cancer patient a course
of chemotherapy which they believed to be inhumane and pointless.
Once again the court was moved to take action by the plight of the
patient in the particular case and that of the medical profession in
general. The court wanted to protect Mr. Saikewicz from being
physically forced to endure the painful treatment that he would not
7. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
8. Id. at 668.
9. Id. at 672.
10.

370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
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understand, and which would cause unpleasant and debilitating
side-effects while offering him only, at best, the chance of a few
additional months of life. The court also wanted to establish "a
framework in the law on which the activities of health care person
nel and other persons can find support."ll Like the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts based
its decision on the constitutional right to privacy which, according
to the court, "encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or
her right to privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integ
rity in appropriate circumstances."12 However, the court then
made an effort to develop the law of the right to die beyond the
point to which it had been taken in Quinlan.
First, the court made an attempt to generalize .the principles
that it was applying beyond the narrow facts of cases involving pa
tients in a persistent vegetative state or terminally-ill cancer pa
tients. It did this by first delineating four State interests which, in
every instance, were to be weighed against the patient's right to
privacy in determining whether the patient had a right to die under
the circumstances of the case. 13 These were identified state inter
ests in a) protecting innocent third parties (such as dependent chil
dren), b) preventing suicide, c) protecting the ethical integrity of
the medical profession, and d) preserving human life.1 4 The last of
these, the court stated, deserved the greatest consideration.1 5 But it
was to be given much reduced weight in any· case, such as the one
before the court, where the question was not one of saving life but
merely prolonging it. 16
The interest of the State in prolonging a life, must be reconciled
with the interest of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of
that prolongation. There is a substantial distinction in the State's
insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is cura
ble, as opposed to the State interest where, as here, the issue is
not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the indi
vidual that life may be briefly extendedP

Second, the court developed a significantly different process
from the one in Quinlan for protecting the rights of incompetent
Id. at 422.
Id. at 424.
See id. at 425-27.
See id.
See id. at 425.
See id. at 425-26.
17. Id.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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patients. Rather than merely delegating decision-making power to
the patient's guardian, family, and physician together with a hospi
tal ethics committee, the Saikewicz court required that procedures
be established for determining what the patient would have wanted
for himself if he had been competent to make the decision. The
court believed that
both the guardian ad litem in his recommendation and the judge
in his decision should have attempted (as they did) to ascertain
the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences. In
short, the decision in cases [involving incompetent patients]
should be that which would be made by the incompetent person,
if that person were competent, but taking into account the pres
ent and future incompetency of the individual as one of the fac
tors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making
process of the competent person. IS

The court, realizing that such a test presented special dangers, par
ticularly in the case of a profoundly retarded patient, hastened to
add: "[T]he chance of a longer life carries the same weight for
Saikewicz as for any other person, the value of life under the law
having no relation to intelligence or social position."19 In order to
make sure that the test was applied in a non-discriminatory fashion,
the court determined that it should be administered by a court of
law.20 The court reasoned that
such questions of life and death ... require the process of de
tached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.
Achieving this ideal is [the court's] responsibility ... , and is not
to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the
"morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly
motivated or impressively constituted.21

Over the next few years, the Massachusetts courts made signifi
cant additional progress in developing and refining principles of law
in this area. In 1978, the Massachusetts Appeals Court rendered
two noteworthy decisions. In Lane v. Candura,22 the court reversed
a lower court's finding that a seventy-seven year old widow suffer
ing from gangrene of her right leg and foot was mentally incompe
18. Id. at 431.
Id.
20. See id. at 435.
21. Id.
22. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App.
19.

a. 1978).
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tent to refuse an amputation that her doctors claimed was necessary
to keep her alive.23 Since Mrs. Candura, unlike Mr. Saikewicz, was
not terminally ill, the court had to deal with the issue of whether a
patient had the right to refuse an amputation that could be classi
fied as "life-saving" rather than merely "life-prolonging."24 Finding
the Saikewicz distinction to be unworkable in the case before it, the
court created new one based upon the "intrusiveness" of the pro
posed medical intervention:25
The ... State interests [in] the preservation of life and the protec
tion of the integrity of the medical profession, call for a balancing
of those interests against the "strong interest [of the individual]
in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integ
rity." The magnitude o/the invasion proposed in this case is deci
sive in applying the balancing test.26
In the second 1978 case, In re Dinnerstein,27 the Appeals Court
directed the lower court to rule that an attending physician could
lawfully issue a do not resuscitate order for an incompetent patient
despite the fact that there had been no court determination, as
seemed to be required by Saikewicz, that the patient would have
asked for such action to be taken if she had been competent to
ask.28 Mrs. Dinnerstein suffered from Alzheimer's disease, was to
tally paralyzed on her left side, and was confined to a hospital bed
in what the court called "an essentially vegetative state."29
She [was] fed through a naso-gastric tube, intravenous feeding
having been abandoned because it came to cause her pain. It is
probable that she [was] experiencing some discomfort from the
naso-gastric tube, which [could have] cause[ed] irritation, ulcera
tion, and infection in her throat and esophageal tract, and which
[was] removed from time to time, and that procedure itself
cause[d) discomfort. She [was] catheterized and also, of course,
require[d] bowel care. Apart from her Alzheimer'S disease and
paralysis, she suffer[ed] from high blood pressure which [was]
difficult to control; there [was] risk in lowering it due to a con
striction in an artery leading to a kidney. She [had] a serious,
life-threatening coronary artery disease, due to arteriosclerosis.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 1236.
See id. at 1233.
See id.
Id. at 1233 n.2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
See id. at 137-39.
Id. at 135.
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Her condition [was] hopeless, but it [was] difficult to predict ex
actly when she [WOUld] die. Her life expectancy [was] no more
than a year, but she could go into cardiac or respiratory arrest at
any time. One of these, or another stroke, [was] most likely to be
the immediate cause of her death. 30
In light of the utter hopelessness of Mrs. Dinnerstein's condition
and the highly intrusive nature of cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
the court concluded that it was unnecessary for a court to deter
mine what Mrs. Dinnerstein would have wanted for herself,31 be
cause, according to the court,
[This] case [did] not ... present, the type of significant treatment
choice or election which, in light of sound medical advice, [was]
to be made by the patient, if competent to do so. . . . This case
[did] not offer a life-saving or life-prolonging treatment alterna
tive within the meaning of the Saikewicz case. It present[ed] a
question peculiarly within the competence of the medical profes
sion of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent pass
ing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the patient's
history and condition and the wishes of her family.32
In 1979, the Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to re
consider the life-prolonging versus life-saving treatment distinction
it had employed in Saikewicz, and rejected it in favor of the intru
siveness standard of Candura and Dinnerstein. In Commissioner of
Correction v. Myers,33 the court held that a prisoner who suffered
total kidney failure could be compelled to submit to hemodialysis
despite his protests. The court's decision was justified on the basis
that the State's interest in preserving prison discipline outweighed
Mr. Myers' constitutional right to privacy.34 But, in passing, the
court noted that, had Mr. Myers not been a prisoner, he would have
had the right to prefer death over continued maintenance on dialy
sis,35 since
the State's interest in the preservation of life does not invariably
control the right to refuse treatment in cases of positive progno
sis. For example, in Lane v. Candura, the Appeals Court upheld
the right of a competent adult to refuse a leg amputation that
would save, not merely prolong, her life. The decisive factor in
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See id. at 139.
Id.
399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).
See id. at 458.
See id.
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applying the balancing test in that case was the magnitude of the
proposed invasion.36

Regarding the hemodialysis treatment the court concluded:
Unlike the relatively simple and risk-free treatments of support
ive oral or intravenous medications, dialysis exacts a significant
price from Myers in return for saving his life. In spite of the fact
that dialysis does not require the sacrifice of a limb or entail sub
stantial pain, it is a relatively complex procedure, which requires
considerable commitment and endurance from the patient who
must undergo the treatment three times a week. 37

Although this statement was dictum in Myers, it was turned into a
holding a year later in In re Spring,38 where the court determined
that an incompetent patient could be removed from dialysis upon a
showing that he would have requested removal if he had been
competent.39
Thus, by small steps, the courts of Massachusetts were gradu
ally broadening and refining the rights of patients to control their
treatment in a medical setting, even when the exercise of that con
trol would hasten death. In Saikewicz the exercise of that right had
been restricted to situations where the patient faced imminent
death, with or without treatment. In Candura, Myers, and Spring,
it was extended to cases where the patient was not terminally ill, so
long as the patient was refusing medical treatment which was prop
erly labeled intrusive. Fmally, in 1986, in Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hospital,40 the Supreme Judicial Court extended the right to
include any treatment which the patient deemed intrusive, even if
others might not see it as objectively intrusive. Mr. Brophy, who
was in a persistent vegetative state, had clearly expressed on many
occasions, before he fell ill, that he would rather be dead than main
tained on artificial life-support of any kind. He had once said to his
brother: "If I'm ever like that, just shoot me. Pull the plug." In
order to effectuate these wishes, Mrs. Brophy sought to have Mr.
Brophy's G-tube removed in order to allow him to die of starvation
or dehydration. The lower court had found that this was what Mr.
Brophy would have wanted, but it did not think that his right to
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted).
Id. at 457.
405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980).
See id. at 119-23.
497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
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privacy entitled him to starve or dehydrate himself to death. The
Supreme Judicial Court reversed on this latter point, and stated that
Brophy is not terminally ill nor in danger of imminent death from
any underlying physical illness. . . . While the judge found that
continued use of the G-tube is not a highly invasive or intrusive
procedure and may not subject him to pain or suffering, he is left
helpless and in a condition which Brophy has indicated he would
consider to be degrading and without human dignity. In making
this finding, it is clear that the judge failed to consider that
Brophy's judgment would be that being maintained by use of the
G-tube is indeed intrusive.41

A year before the decision in Brophy, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey decided In re Conroy,42 its first "right to die" case since
Quinlan. Claire Conroy was an incompetent eighty-four year old
nursing home patient who was dependent upon a nasogastric tube
for nourishment and hydration. 43 "She suffered from arterioscle
rotic heart disease, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus; her left leg
was gangrenous ...; she had [bed sores] on her left foot, leg, and
hip; an eye problem required irrigation; she ... could not control
her bowels; she could not speak; and her ability to swallow was very
limited."44 Because of her condition, Ms. Conroy's guardian (who
was also her nearest relative) applied to the New Jersey courts to
authorize the removal of her nasogastric tube so that her life would
not be pointlessly prolonged. 45 In an opinion which borrowed
heavily from the Massachusetts decisions rendered since Quinlan,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that Ms. Conroy, if compe
tent, had the right to have the tube removed. Finding this right to
be based in both the common law of informed consent and the con
stitutional right of privacy, the court weighed it against a list of
countervailing State interests adopted from Saikewicz and held that
none of the interests defeated Ms. Conroy's right to choose death,
despite the fact that she was neither terminally-ill nor in a persistent
vegetative state. In language which presaged the decision in
Brophy, the court made clear that Ms.Conroy's right to refuse life
saving treatment could not be made conditional on other persons'
views of the appropriateness of her decision. Accordingly, "[h]er
interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her bodily in
41.

Id. at 635-36.

42.

486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
See id. at 1217.

43.
44. Id.
45. See iLl. at 1218.
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tegrity would outweigh any state interest in preserving life or in
safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession."46 Indeed, the
court stated that, "Ms. Conroy's right to self-determination would
not be affected by her medical condition or prognosis."47 Beyond
that, the court stated that "a young, generally healthy person, if
competent, has the same right to decline life-saving medical treat
ment as a competent elderly person who is terminally ill. "48
However, Ms. Conroy was not competent, and the court was
not comfortable with employing for her the proxy decision-making
procedures it had used for Karen Quinlan.
The Quinlan decision dealt with a special category of patients:
those in a chronic, persistent vegetative or comatose state. In a
footnote, the opinion left open the question whether the princi
ples it enunciated might be applicable to incompetent patients in
"other types of terminal medical situations, . . . not necessarily
involving the hopeless loss of cognitive or sapient life." We now
are faced with one such situation: that of elderly, formerly com
petent nursing home residents who, unlike Karen Quinlan, are
awake and conscious and can interact with their environment to a
limited extent, but whose mental and physical functioning is se
verely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy,
even with the treatment, is relatively short.49

For such patients, the court adopted a version of the Massachusetts
procedure for proxy decision-making. In reaching an acceptable
decision on behalf of the incompetent patient, the court stated, "the
goal of decision-making ... should be to determine and effectuate,
insofar as possible, the decision that the patient would have made if
competent. "50 In attempting to achieve that goal, all sources of evi
dence of the incompetent's wishes should be consulted. A living
will or durable power attorney for health care executed by the pa
tient while competent-although not recognized as binding by New
Jersey legislation-might be one valuable source. Other evidence
such as oral statements, reactions that the patient voiced regarding
medical treatment administered to others, and religious views all
might bear on the question. "In this respect [the court] believe[d]
that [it was] in error in Quinlan to disregard evidence of statements
that Ms. Quinlan made to friends concerning artificial prolongation
46. Id. at 1226.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1228-29 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 1229.
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of the lives of others who were terminally ill. "51
The court emphasized that the test was to be subjective. "The
question is not," said the court, "what a reasonable or average per
son would have chosen to do under the circumstances but what the
particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself."52
However, the court realized that in many cases there would not be
sufficient evidence to make it "clear that the particular patient
would have refused the treatment under the circumstances in
volved."53 So as not to "foreclose the possibility of humane actions,
which may involve termination of life-sustaining treatment, for per
sons who never clearly expressed their desires about life-sustaining
treatment,"54 the court decided to offer two alternatives to its pure
subjective test. Under one, the "limited-objective test," a patient in
Ms. Conroy's situation could have life-sustaining treatment with
held or withdrawn where "there is some trustworthy evidence that
the patient would have refused the treatment, and the decision
maker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens of the patient's
continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life
for him."55 Under the other, the "pure-objective test," a patient
could be permitted to die without any showing of what the patient
would have wanted. However, it would be necessary to prove that
"the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life
with the treatment [are] such that the effect of administering life
sustaining treatment would be inhumane" in addition to showing
that the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment clearly
and markedly outweigh any benefits to him.56 Even under the
pure-objective test, the court made clear that "life-sustaining treat
ment should not be withdrawn from an incompetent patient who
had previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain
that he might experience."57
At one point in its opinion, the court complained about being
forced to fashion so much complicated law to fill the vacuum left by
the legislature's failure to take action regarding the right to die in
the nine years since Quinlan.
Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear stan
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1230.
at 1229.
at 1231.
at 1232.
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dards for resolving requests to terminate life-sustaining treat
ment for incompetent patients. As an elected body, the
Legislature is better able than any other single institution to re
tlect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the resources
and ability to synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from
a variety of fields and to formulate general guidelines that may
be applicable to a broad range of situations.58

However, the court noted "[w]e have had the benefit of some legis
lation in this state concerning the rights of the institutionalized eld
erly," including rules "directed to the protection of the civil and
human rights of the elderly confined to long-term care facilities and
similar institutions."59 Among these rules was one enacted in 1983
that charged the state Office of the Ombudsman for the Institution
alized Elderly with responsibility for protecting institutionalized
elderly patients from "abuse"-a term which was defined to include
"wilful deprivation of services which are necessary to maintain a
person's physical or mental health."60 This new provision, the court
noted, creates "a vehicle for safeguarding the rights of elderly, insti
tutionalized, incompetent patients both to receive medical treat
ment and to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment under certain
circumstanceS."61 The court availed itself of this vehicle by estab
lishing a procedure for future cases in which life-sustaining treat
ment could not be withheld or withdrawn from an elderly,
institutionalized, incompetent patient unless the Ombudsman had
first determined that no abuse was taking place. This he was to do
by investigating the situation and taking evidence from the attend
ing physician and nurses, from the patient's guardian and family,
and from two independent physicians appointed for the purpose of
confirming the patient's medical condition and prognosis.
At the very end of the Conroy opinion, the court summed up
its work by saying:
We have not attempted to set forth guidelines for decision
making with respect to life-sustaining treatment in a variety of
other situations that are not currently before us. Innumerable
variations are possible. However, each case-such as that of the
severely deformed newborn, of the never-competent adult suffer
ing from a painful and debilitating illness, and of the mentally
58. Id. at 1220-21 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 1221 (referring to N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27G-1 to -16 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1997».
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27G-2a (West 1986).
61. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1239.
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alert quadriplegic who has given up on life-poses its own unique
difficulties. We do not deem it advisable to attempt to resolve all
such human dilemmas in the context of this case. It is preferable,
in our view, to move slowly and to gain experience in this highly
sensitive field. As we noted previously, the Legislature is better
equipped than we to develop and frame a comprehensive plan
for resolving these problems.62
By 1987, the New Jersey legislature still had not acted, and the
New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with three more right to
die cases in which it was required to make law. "[T]hese three ap
peals," said the court, "concern the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from three women suffering from incurable and irrevers
ible medical conditions. Because of their ages, places of residence,
and medical conditions, none of their cases falls within the factual
pattern of either of our seminal decisions, Quinlan or Conroy."63
The court recognized, as it did in Conroy, "and as have numerous
other courts, that given the fundamental societal questions that
must be resolved, the Legislature is the proper branch of govern
ment to set guidelines in this area."64
[P]atients and their families and physicians are increasingly being
faced with these difficult and complex decisions without legisla
tive guidelines and under the threat of civil and criminal liability.
Until the Legislature acts, it is to the courts that the public must
look for the guidelines and procedures under which life-sus
taining medical treatment may be withdrawn or withheld. Sensi
tive to the patients' rights to self-determination, but cognizant of
the vulnerability of the sick, [the courts] strive to protect all of
the relevant interests.65

In the first of the three cases, In re Farrell,66 the court estab
lished principles and procedures for cases where competent patients
dying at home requested that their deaths be hastened through re
moval of life-support. Kathleen Farrell was a thirty-four year old
woman who was dying at home of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. In
November of 1985, "after an experimental program that her hus
band characterized as 'their last hope' had failed, Mrs. Farrell told
him that she wanted to be disconnected from the respirator that
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1244.
In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406-07 (NJ. 1987) (citations omitted).
Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
Id. at 408.

66.

529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
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sustained her breathing."67 A consulting psychologist met with
Mrs. Farrell and concluded that "Mrs. Farrell had made an in
formed, voluntary, and competent decision to remove the respira
tor."68 Nonetheless, because of doubts as to the legality of
hastening Mrs. Farrell's death in this fashion, Mr. Farrell applied to
the New Jersey courts for, among other things, "a declaratory judg
ment that he and anyone who assisted him in disconnecting her res
pirator would incur no civil or criminalliability."69 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that the respirator could be removed
without fear of liability so long as certain procedures were followed.
First, it must be determined "that the patient is competent and
properly informed about his or her prognosis, the alternative treat
ments available, and the risk involved in the withdrawal of the life
sustaining treatment .. " [Furthermore] the patient [must make]
his or her choice voluntarily and without coercion."70 Second, "the
patient's right to choose to disconnect the life-sustaining apparatus
must be balanced against the four potentially countervailing state
interests [which we have discussed]. Generally, a competent in
formed patient's interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion
of her bodily integrity would outweigh any state interest."71 Third,
in order to
protect the patient who is at home, [the court required] that two
non-attending physicians examine the patient to confirm that he
or she is competent and is fully informed about his or her prog
nosis, the medical alternatives available, the risks involved, and
the likely outcome if medical treatment is disconnected.72

In conclusion the court stated:
Unfortunately fears of civil and criminal liability have often
forced family members or doctors to seek judicial intervention
before they help a patient effectuate his or her decision to with
draw treatment. . .. In light of this, we specifically hold that no
civil or criminal liability will be incurred by any person who, in
good faith reliance on the procedures established in this opinion,
withdraws life-sustaining treatment at the request of an informed
and competent patient who has undergone the required in
67. Id. at 408-09.
68. Id. at 409.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 413 (citation omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 415.
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dependent medical examination described above. 73

The remaining two cases, In re Peter74 and In re Jobes,75 were
the first cases involving patients in a persistent vegetative state that
the court had faced since their 1976 decision in Quinlan. The New
Jersey Supreme Court saw them, among other things, as an oppor
tunity to revisit and revise Quinlan in light of the law the court had
developed in the intervening eleven years. In Jobes, the husband of
a thirty-one year old PVS patient in a nursing home sought to en
able the patient to die with dignity by disconnecting her from artifi
cial nutrition and hydration. At trial, there was conflicting evidence
as to whether Nancy Jobes was in fact in a persistent vegetative
state. Two nursing home experts contended that she fell "slightly
outside of their definition of the persistent vegetative state."76 Af
ter stating that Conroy had established the principle that "all medi
cal determinations made in the course of a decision to withhold
treatment from an incompetent patient [must] be based upon clear
and convincing medical evidence," the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that the experts for Mr. Jobes had "offered sufficiently
clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding
that Mrs. Jobes is in an irreversible vegetative state."77 Thereafter,
to deal with the question of the appropriateness of removing artifi
cial nutrition and hydration in the circumstances of the case, the
court developed a set of principles and procedures which was an
amalgam of Quinlan and Conroy. Whereas Quinlan had delegated
the withdrawal of treatment decision to a group of proxy decision
makers, Conroy had laid down a methodology for attempting to
determine what decision the patient would have made for himself if
the patient were competent. Relying upon Conroy, Mr. Jobes had
introduced considerable evidence that his wife would have wished
to be taken off life-support. The Supreme Court determined that
Mr. Jobes had been correct in assuming that Conroy would have
governed rather than Quinlan if Mr. Jobes had sufficient proof of
Mrs. Jobes' wishes. However, the court concluded that "although
there is some 'trustworthy' evidence that Mrs. Jobes, if competent,
would want the j-tube withdrawn, it is not sufficiently 'clear and
convincing' to satisfy the subjective test."78 "All of the statements
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).
529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
Id. at 44O-4l.
Id. at 44l.
Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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about life-support that were attributed to Mrs. Jobes were remote,
. general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances. "79 The
court then considered the applicability to Mrs. Jobes' case of Con
roy's limited-objective and pure-objective tests. The court ruled
that the tests were not applicable. Essential to the administration
of those tests was a balancing of the actual burdens and benefits to
an incompetent patient. But since there was no evidence that per
sons in a persistent vegetative state could feel either pleasure or
pain, there were no burdens or benefits to be weighed. As a result,
the court returned to the proxy decision-making procedure of
Quinlan.
Where an irreversibly vegetative patient like Mrs. Jobes has
not clearly expressed her intentions with respect to medical treat
ment, the Quinlan "substituted judgment" approach best accom
plishes the goal of having the patient make her own decision. In
most cases in which the "substituted judgment" doctrine is ap
plied, the surrogate decisionmaker will be a family member or
close friend of the patient. Generally it is the patient's family or
other loved ones who support and care for the patient and who
best understand the patient's personal values and beliefs. Hence
they will be best able to make a substituted medical judgment for
the patient.
Ideally, each person should set forth his or her intentions
with respect to life-supporting treatment. This insures that the
patient's own resolution of this extraordinarily personal issue will
be honored. Failure to express one's intentions imposes an awe
some and painful responsibility on the surrogate decision
maker. 8o
In light of the fact that the ability to set forth such intentions con

tinued to be hampered by the legislature's continuing failure to en
act living will or health care proxy legislation, the court concluded
by saying: "As we have previously explained, the Legislature is bet
ter equipped than the judiciary to frame comprehensive guidelines
and procedures for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Ac
cordingly, we urge it to pass legislation in this area."81
In re Peter ,fI2 the third companion case, also dealt with a re
quest to remove life-support from a patient in a persistent vegeta
79. Id.
80. Id. at 451.
81. Id. at 452.
82. 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).
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tive state. Its facts differed from those of Jobes in that Ms. Peter
was a sixty-five year old nursing home resident, and she had left
"clear and convincing evidence" of a desire to be taken off life
support if she were in a persistent vegetative state.83 Mrs. Jobes
had been in a nursing home, but she was not elderly. Thus there
was no need to involve the New Jersey Ombudsman procedure that
had been laid down in Conroy. Because Ms. Peter was both in a
nursing home and elderly, the court held that the Ombudsman had
to be consulted to make sure that no abuse was taking place. The
court reasoned:
We recognize that elderly nursing home patients in the persistent
vegetative state are threatened by the same conditions that put
patients like Claire Conroy at risk, i.e., an uneven level of care,
minimal medical supervision, and frequent lack of family sup
port. Accordingly, the Ombudsman, in consonance with his stat
utory mandate, must be given the opportunity to investigate and
prevent any possible mistreatment of elderly nursing home pa
tients who have been declared to be in a persistent vegetative
state.84

With respect to the proof of Ms. Peter's wishes, the lower court had
been presented with a durable power of attorney signed by Ms. Pe
ter in which she authorized "Eberhard Johanning to make 'all med
ical decisions' for her and 'to be given full and complete authority
to manage and direct her medical care."'85 "Clearly the best evi
dence [of intent]," said the court,
is a "living will," a written statement that specifically explains the
patient's preferences about life-sustaining treatment. Some
states have statutes that recognize the validity of living wills and
prescribe procedures for their execution. Unfortunately, the
New Jersey Legislature has not enacted such a law. "Whether or
not they are legally binding, however, such advance directives are
relevant evidence of the patient's intent."86

Hilda Peter had not left a living will, but she had executed a durable
power of attorney.87
New Jersey's Powers of Attorney statute provides that a "princi
pal may confer authority on an agent that is to be exercisable
83. See id. at 422.
84. Id. at 428-29 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 426.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. See id.
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notwithstanding later disability or incapacity of the principal at
law or later uncertainty as to whether the principal is dead or
alive." Although the statute does not specifically authorize con
veyance of durable authority to make medical decisions, it should
be interpreted that way.
.
It would have been better if Ms. Peter had specifically pro
vided in her power of attorney that Mr. Johanning had authority
to terminate life-sustaining treatment. Nonetheless, that instru
ment, which she executed shortly before she became incompe
tent; Mr. Johanning's explanation that Ms. Peter directed him to
refuse life-sustaining treatment on her behalf in a situation like
this; and nine reliable hearsay accounts of her disinclination for
the kind of treatment that Mr. Johanning seeks to discontinue
establish clearly and convincingly that Hilda Peter WOUld, if com
petent, choose to withdraw the nasogastric tube that is sustaining
her.88
In 1991, the New Jersey State Legislature finally enacted legis
lation providing for "advance directives for health care."89 But, un
til that time, the law of the right to die in New Jersey was governed
entirely by principles and procedures developed by New Jersey
courts, out of decisions in cases that cried out for recognition of a
right to die on the facts presented. At each step along the way, the
New Jersey Supreme Court described itself as being forced to act, at
least in part, in the face of legislature's failure to do so-going so
far as to establish, on its own authority, the legality of living wills
and durable powers of attorney for health care. In Massachusetts,
the state legislature ultimately passed legislation which authorized
the execution of formal documents to appoint a health care proxy,90
but living wills are still given recognition in Massachusetts only
under the State's right to die case law.91 Even in states where com
prehensive right to die legislation has been enacted, courts have
been required to fashion common law as part of the comprehensive
package of rules governing the right to die.
California was the first state to pass living will legislation. Its
Natural Death Act92 was passed in 1976. Nonetheless, in 1983,
when murder charges were brought against two California physi
cians who had removed life-support from a patient in a vegetative
88. Id. at 426-27 (footnotes and citations omitted).
89. Advance Directives for Health Care, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78
(West 1996).
90. Health Care Proxies, MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 2010 (1996).
91. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
92. CAL. REALm & SAFETY CoDE § 7185 (West Supp. 1997).
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state, the California courts were forced to create a new rule of law
in order to achieve what they believed to be the just result. In Bar
ber v. Superior Coun,93 the California Court of Appeals dismissed
the murder charges on the ground that the law had not required the
physicians to provide artificial life-support to the patient after such
treatment became "disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be
gained versus the burdens caused. "94 This principle was not one
which the court could derive from the state's legislation. The
State's Uniform Determination of Death Act95 related only to situ
ations where a patient's "whole brain" was no longer functioning,
and patients in a persistent vegetative state retained lower brain
function. The State's Natural Death Act dealt only with situations
where patients had executed living wills to direct how they were to
be treated after they lost competence. The patient in Barber had
executed no living will; but the patient's physicians had determined
that he had no reasonable chance of returning to a cognitive state.
Additionally, the patient's relatives had requested in writing that he
be taken off artificial food and hydration. The court said that
the only long-term solution to this problem is necessarily legisla
tive in nature. It is that body which must address the moral, so
cial, ethical, medical and legal issues raised by cases such as the
one at bench. Manifestly, this court cannot attempt to rewrite
the statutory definition of death or set forth guidelines covering
all possible future cases. Due to legislative inaction in this area,
however, we are forced to evaluate petitioner's conduct within
the context of the woefully inadequate framework of the criminal
law.96

The court found the starting point for its solution in the com
mon law of informed consent, which "clearly recognized [a] legal
right to control one's own medical treatment [that] predated the
Natural Death Act."97 Citing to, among others, the Massachusetts
and New Jersey cases dealing with the right to die, the court held
that the common law right to control one's medical treatment in
cluded the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment where such
treatment becomes "disproportionate." "Under this approach, pro
portionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient, has at
least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient, which
93. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006 (1983).
94. Id. at 1019.
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7180 (West Supp. 1997).
96. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014.
97. Id. at 1015.
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benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."98 But
what should be done where the patient is no longer competent to
express his views and has not executed a living will? As to patients
in a persistent vegetative state, the court developed an approach
that was an amalgam of the tacks taken in the New Jersey and Mas
sachusetts cases. Quoting first from Quinlan, the court said:
"'[T]he focal point of decision should be the prognosis as to the
reasonable possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as dis
tinguished from the forced continuance of that biological vegetative
existence .... "'99 Then quoting from Dinnerstein, the court said:
"'Prolongation of life, ... does not mean a mere suspension of the
act of dying, but contemplates, at the very least, a remission of
symptoms enabling a return towards a normal, functioning, inte
grated existence."'l00 Fmally, citing to Saikewicz, the court said:
"The authorities are in agreement that any surrogate, court ap
pointed or otherwise, ought to be guided in his or her decisions first
by his knowledge of the patient's own desires and feelings, to the
extent that they were expressed before the patient became incom
petent. "101 The court said if that is not possible,
the surrogate ought to be guided in his decision by the patient's
best interests. Under this standard, such factors as the relief of
suffering, the preservation or restoration of functioning and the
quality as well as extent of life sustained may be considered. Fi
nally, since most people are concerned about the well-being of
their loved ones, the surrogate may take into account the impact
of the decision on those people closest to the patient. 102

The court noted that
[i]f specific procedural rules are to be adopted in this area in or
der to protect the public interest, they must necessarily come
from that body most suited for the collection of data and the
reaching of a consensus-the Legislature. However, we would
[have been] derelict in our duties if we [had] not provide[d) some
general guidelines for future conduct in the absence of such
legislation. 103

A Connecticut case, McConnell v. .Beverly Enterprises-Con
98. Id. at 1019.
99. Id. (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976».
100. Id. at 1019-20 (quoting In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978».
101. Id. at 1021 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977».
102. Id. at 1021.
103. Id. at 1018.
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necticut, Inc. ,104 provides an illustration of the role that courts can
play in developing common law even where State legislatures have
provided specific procedural and substantive rules for the removal
of life-support systems. In 1985, the Connecticut State Legislature
enacted a provision called the Removal of Life Support Systems
Act.1OS It provided: "Any physician licensed under chapter 370 or
any licensed medical facility which removes or causes the removal
of a life support system of an incompetent patient shall not be liable
for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any
criminal proceeding for such removal" so long as 1) the patient is
terminally ill, and 2) the decision is based upon a) "the best medical
judgment of the attending physician,"106 b) "the informed co~sent
of the next of kin, if known, or legal guardian,"107 and c) "the pa
tient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly, through his next
of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a document executed in
accordance with [this act]."108 The term "Life Support System," as
used in the statute, included "any mechanical or electronic device,"
but excluded "the provision of nutrition and hydration."109 Thus,
when John McConnell sought to have a gastrostomy tube removed
from his wife so that she could die with dignity rather than continue
to live in a persistent vegetative state, the statute seemed to pre
clude granting him the relief he requested. What he was asking for
was cessation of the provision of nutrition and hydration.
Mrs. McConnell was a fifty-seven year old nurse who had
worked in emergency medicine up until the time of the accident
which had rendered her comatose. "[B]ecause of her professional
training and experience," the court found,
Mrs. McConnell understood the status of patients with traumatic
brain damage and was fully familiar with all forms of life-sus
taining equipment, including respirators and gastrostomy tubes.
She had, in fact, expressly and repeatedly told her family and her
co-workers that, in the event of her permanent total incapacity,
she did not want to be kept alive by any artificial means, includ
ing life-sustaining feeding tubes. 110

Despite the clear language of The Removal of Life Support Sys
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580d (West Supp. 1997).
Id. at § 19a-571(a) (amended 1991).
Id.
Id.
109. Id. at § 19a-570 (emphasis added).
110. McConnell, 553 A.2d at 598-99.
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tems Act, all of the judges who dealt with the case determined that
Mrs. McConnell had a right to remove the gastrostomy tube. At
the trial level, the court justified the result on Mrs. McConnell's
"common law right to self-determination, supported by a constitu
tional right to privacy" which coexisted with the statutory provi
sions "by which the legislature authorized the removal of life
support systems under statutorily specified circumstances."111 On
appeal, Associate Justice Healey would have affirmed on this
ground. "I believe that the statutory scheme did not entirely dis
place the common law," he said.
"It is an established rule of statutory construction that statutes
are not readily interpreted as abrogating common-law rights." It

is also a rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation
of the common law are strictly construed. "No statute is to be
construed as altering the common law farther than its words im
port. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the
common law which it does not fairly express."
The exclusion of "the provision of nutrition and hydration"
from the definition of "life support system" strongly suggests a
legislative intent to address only the withdrawal of "any mechani
cal or electronic device from a terminal patient." The exclusion
does not suggest an intent to displace the common law right to
self-determination of one's bodily integrity as it pertains to the
withdrawal of other medical treatment, including extraordinary
means of nutrition and hydration. 112

But a majority of the court felt obligated to decide the case by
applying the statute to the facts of the case. "Many of the cases
upholding a right of self-determination for terminally-ill individuals
have urged legislatures to enact guidelines for appropriate private
decision-making in these heart-rending dilemmas," noted the ma
jority opinion. "When the legislature has attempted to respond to
this urgent request for statutory assistance, we have an obligation to
pursue the applicability of statutory criteria before resorting to an
exploration of residual common law rights, if any such rights indeed
remain."113 The court then went on to interpret the statute to per
mit withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. It held that the
exclusion of the provision of "nutrition and hydration" from the
definition of "life support systems" that could be removed from ter
111. [d. at 599.
112. [d. at 606-07 (Healey, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
113. [d. at 602 (citations omitted).
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minally ill patients was meant to apply only to spoon feeding and
water provided by mouth. The court agreed that it made sense
to recognize a ... distinction between artificial technology to as
sist nutrition and hydration, a fortiori included within the defini
tion of a "life support system," and normal procedures to assist in
feeding. In other words, the act, read in its entirety and giving
effect to every section[,] implicitly contemplates the possible re
moval from a terminally ill patient of artificial technology in the
form of a device such as a gastrostomy tube, but it does· not,
under any circumstances, permit the withholding of normal nutri
tional aids such as a spoon or a straw.114
"Our construction of the act," said the court, "implements its benef
icent purpose of providing functional guidelines for the exercise of
the common law and constitutional rights of self-determination
that, as we have noted above, have received almost universal recog
nition."115 It also, as the court pointed out, provided an interpreta
tion that would save the statute from any constitutional attack. The
court said that
[T]he plaintiffs in the case have indeed raised such a constitu
tional claim. We need not, however, address this claim on its
merits when we can instead find redress for the plaintiffs by an
appropriate construction of the applicable statutes. Established
wisdom counsels us to exercise "self-restraint" so as "to eschew
unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions." It is,
nonetheless, relevant to our construction of the statutory exclu
sion that our interpretation avoids placing the Removal of Life
Support Systems Act in constitutional jeopardy.116
Obviously, common law courts have played an enormous role
in the development of the law of the right to die. But this is not to
say that State legislatures have not played an important role as well.
By 1994, forty-seven states had enacted some form of living will
legislation.117 Like the California Natural Death Act of 1976, they
provided competent individuals with an opportunity to execute for
mal advance directives instructing physicians and family as to their
wishes regarding life-prolonging treatment. Over the years, several
national organizations have promoted "model" forms of such legis
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 602-03 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 603.
Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
See Introduction to REFuSAL OF TREATMENT

LEGISLATION:
STATE CoMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES 1 (1994).
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lation, and the legislation that has been enacted has tended to be
based upon a small number of types. But in detail, the legislation
tends to be very variegated-evidencing the fact that different com
promises have been worked out in different States over the funda
mental value issues involved. Additionally, the legislation has
tended to be amended frequently as new issues have arisen and new
majorities have formed around them. For example, many of the
earliest living will statutes authorized decisions only for patients
who were "terminally ill" (typically defined as someone who had
only six months to live).118 By 1994, the vast majority of living will
statutes no longer contained such restrictions, and many of them
had been amended to authorize decisions for patients in a perma
nent vegetative state who might live on for decades. On the other
hand, some of the early restrictions have persisted. For example,
living will statutes in thirty-four States explicitly refuse authorizing
withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment from pregnant patients. 119
A second wave of statutes regulating refusal of life prolonging
treatment for incompetent patients took a different approach-that
of allowing the patient to appoint a "health care agent." These stat
utes empowered the patient to execute a formal document ap
pointing another person to make a health care decision for him if
the patient were to become incompetent. Proponents believed this
to be a much more effective way to assure that physicians would
respect patient autonomy.1 20 At a time when the patient could not
assert his own rights, the physician would not be left with a mere
piece of paper containing necessarily vague statements about the
patient's feelings regarding "death with dignity." Instead, the phy
sician would receive direction from an agent who had been picked
by the patient because the agent knew the patient well enough to
assert his rights for him. Such legislation quickly received wide
spread acceptance. By 1994, all but one state had enacted some
form of health care agency legislation. 121 As with living williegisla
tion, the basic types of such legislation have been few, but there
have been differences in detail-some of it reflecting different com
118. See, e.g., California Natural Death Act, Sec. 1 § 7187 (e)-(f), 1976 Cal. Stat.
6478,6479 (repealed 1991).
119. See Pregnancy Restrictions in Living Will Statutes, in RIGHT TO DIE LAW
DIGEST (comp. June 1997) (statistics compiled and updated periodically by Choice in
Dying, N.Y., N.Y.).
120. See Arnold S. ReIman, Michigan's Sensible "Living Will," 300 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1270 (1979).
121. See State Statutes Governing Living Wills and Appointment of Health Care
Agents, in RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST, supra note 119.
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promises reached in different states over fundamental value is
sues. 122 On the other hand, whether simply because the health care
agency acts have been more recently passed or because of other
reasons, such acts tend to have fewer "ethical restrictions" associ
ated with them than do the living will acts. For example, only four
teen states have pregnancy restrictions in their health care agency
statutes as opposed to thirty-four which have them in their living
will statutes. 123
Of course, living will and health care agency statutes regulate
decision-making for incompetent patients only where the incompe
tent patient was competent at some point in his life and had the
foresight to execute the formal documents required for taking ad
vantage of the laws. Many cases, such as Saikewicz, involve pa
tients who have never been competent. Moreover, despite great
efforts to urge citizens to write living wills or appoint health care
agents, the vast majority of Americans do not do so. The Patient
Self Determination Act of 1991 124-the only piece of legislation
passed thus far by the U.S. Congress dealing with the right to die
requires all medical facilities receiving federal funds to inform pa
tients of living will and health care agency laws in their state, and to
make available the forms needed for taking advantage of them.
Unfortunately, these efforts have not made a significant increase in
the number of patients availing themselves of those options. Since
polls indicate that the vast majority of persons do wish a "death
with dignity" for themselves and do not want extraordinary meas
ures taken to keep them technically "alive,"125 it does not seem that
they are failing to take advantage of the laws because they are op
posed to having termination of care decisions made for them. Thus,
the question remains of what to do with terminally-ill patients who
become incompetent without having exercised any of these statu
tory options as well as with those who have always been
incompetent.
As of June 1994, twenty-four states had dealt with the first of
these problems by enacting "surrogate decision-making" statutes
that appoint a health care agent for a patient if he does not appoint
122. See Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Living Will Statutes, in RIGHT TO
supra note 119.
123. See Pregnancy Restrictions in Statutes Authorizing Health Care Agents, in
RIGHT TO DIE LAW DIGEST, supra note 119.
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f) (West Supp. 1997).
125. See G. Gallup, Jr. & F. Newport, Mirror of America: Fear of Dying, THE

DIE LAW DIGEST,

GALLUP POLL

vol. 55, no. 33 (Jan. 6, 1991).
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one for himself.126 Again displaying interesting differences in detail
from state to state, these statutes typically appoint, in order of de
scending preference, the sorts of family members that the patient
would be thought most likely to pick for himself. For example, the
first choice might be one's spouse (unless legally separated from the
patient), the second choice, one's adult children, the third, one's
parents, the fourth, one's siblings, etc. These statutes operate much
the same way as intestacy laws which arrange for the inheritance of
one's property by statutorily-selected heirs in cases where the de
ceased has never executed a will. The patient can avoid having the
choice made for him in this way by appointing a different person
under the state's health care agency statute. The surrogate deci
sion-making statutes typically provide the patient with another op
tion as well-that of refusing to have any surrogate appointed for
him on the ground that the patient does not want anyone empow
ered to refuse any medical options that might be available to him.
Despite all of the statutes that have been passed over the last
twenty-five years, families of patients, physicians, and ultimately
the courts, still find themselves confronted with cases in which pro
cedures for proxy decision-making for incompetents have not been
spelled out. Most importantly, twenty-six states do not have stat
utes providing for the appointment of surrogate decision-makers in
the absence of execution of a living will or formal selection of an
agent by a patient.1 27 In addition, there are situations which are
excluded from coverage by statutes, such as decision-making for
neonates and other patients who have never been competent. The
state courts have continued to show a great deal of thought and
creativity in fashioning procedures for dealing with such situations.
Moreover, the courts have been busy creatively interpreting and ap
plying the legislation that has been passed, sometimes providing lib
eral interpretations to conservative statutes as we saw done in
McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, Inc.
As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Public Health,l28 the
development of the law of the right to die in the United States has
been managed almost entirely at the state level in a fashion which
has engaged courts and legislatures in a cooperative enterprise. 129
126. See Introduction to REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 117,
at 2 (1994).
127. See id. at 3.
128. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
129. The Supreme Court reflected that
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The state supreme courts in particular have taken on the law-mak
ing challenges offered by the technological developments of late
twentieth century America. This has been done in a fashion that is
reminiscent of the work of the state supreme courts of the "Golden
Age of American Jurisprudence"-the mid-nineteenth century pe
riod when the state courts were forced to fashion new rules of law
to deal with the development of the railroads, the telephone, the
telegraph, the modern mass-production factory, and the corporate
form of doing business. One reason for the successful operation of
this cooperative effort between courts and legislatures is that in the
area of the right to die, unlike that of the right to choose abortion,
the Supreme Court of the United States has not handed down a
rigid national constitutional standard which chills experimentation
in devising differing legal responses to the problem. In Roe v.
Wade,130 the Supreme Court used the constitutional right to privacy
to essentially write for all of the fifty states the most liberal abortion
statute in the Western World. The constitutional doctrine devel
oped by the United States Supreme Court and the state supreme
courts in the area of the right to die has left much more latitude for
experimentation by means of common law and legislation. In
Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court's one pronouncement on
the subject thus far, the Court recognized in passing that competent
patients were possessed of a "constitutionally protected right to re
fuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,"131 but it held that the state
of Missouri could constitutionally burden that right by imposing a
requirement that the patient's intent to exercise that right must be
proved by no less than "clear and convincing evidence."132 The var
ious state supreme courts that have bottomed the right to die on
various provisions of their state constitutions and the federal consti
tution have, as we saw, continually urged the state legislatures to
develop comprehensive rules for dealing with the issues that were
raised. Indeed, as time has passed, the state supreme courts have
As these cases demonstrate, the common law doctrine of infonned consent is
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse
medical treatment. Beyond that, these decisions demonstrate both similarity
and diversity in their approach to decision of what all agree is a perplexing
question with unusually strong moral and ethical overtones. State courts have
available to them for decision a number of sources-state constitutions, stat
utes, and common law-which are not available to us.
Id. at 277.
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
132. Id. at 280.
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emphasized the constitutional aspects less and have used state com
mon law increasingly-in part, presumably, to provide a greater
scope of experimentation for state legislatures. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, for example, beginning with Conroy, has relied pri
marily upon the common law principles of informed consent, and
only secondarily upon the constitutional right to privacy. "The doc
trine of informed consent, said the court, "is a primary means de
veloped in the law to protect [the] personal interest in the integrity
of one's [own] body."133 The court then added: "The right to make
certain decisions concerning one's body is also protected by the fed
eral constitutional right of privacy."l34 1\vo years later, Farrell reaf
firmed this aspect of Conroy: "[There] we held," said the court,
"that a patient's right to refuse medical treatment even at the risk
of personal injury or death is primarily protected by the common
law, [although] we recognized that it is also protected by the federal
and state constitutional right of privacy."13S
The sort of conversation and cooperation between the com
mon law courts and the state legislatures, that has aided the devel
opment of the law of right to die thus far, has much to offer to the
development of right to die law in the future. It is simplistic to
think that the law of physician-assisted suicide should be developed
by only one or the other of these law-making institutions. Of
course, legislative legalization of physician-assisted suicide might
bring with it many of the virtues which were claimed for legislative
law-making in general at the beginning of this article. Last year,
eight co-authors and I proposed A Model State Act to Authorize
and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide136 for the purpose of expe
diting the passage of such legislation. Several state legislatures are
considering versions of the model act. But the fears that have kept
state legislatures from leading the way in developing the right to die
law in the past still seem to haunt the corridors of our legislative
assemblies. Oregon, has thus far been the only state to legalize
physician-assisted suicide by legislation,137 and that law was enacted
through a citizen initiative vote-not by the normal legislative pro
cess. Indeed, now that the Oregon law seems on the threshold of
133. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985).
134. Id.
135. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (NJ. 1987).
136. See Charles H. Baron et. ai., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEG. 1 (1996).
137. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.80
.897 (Supp. 1996).
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implementation,138 the Oregon legislature may well repeal the initi
ative measure and send it back to the people for a second vote. 139
In the meantime, state courts have continued to press forward
in developing right to die law on a case by case basis. On January 1,
1997, a trial court in Palm Beach Florida rendered its much-antici
pated decision in McIver v. Krischer. 140 The case involved a peti
tion by a physician, Cecil McIver, and a patient, Charles Hall, who
requested declaratory and injunctive relief which would protect Dr.
McIver from prosecution should he choose to assist Mr. Hall in
committing suicide by means of a lethal prescription of drugs.
Charles Hall was terminally ill with AIDS, suffered from a long list
of related illnesses, and "testified that he, at times, [had] sores over
his entire body, red blotches, sores in and about his mouth, fine
hairs on his tongue and sides of his mouth, no feeling in his bladder,
stomach pains, and [was] legally blind."141 He also testified that,
[c]ontemplating his future suffering, he want[ed] to die at the
time and place of his choosing by administering a substance
which would induce immediate loss of consciousness and certain
death shortly thereafter. Yet, he [was] afraid that any attempt to
take his own life at that time [would] be unsuccessful, and
[would] worsen his condition. Therefore, Mr. Hall [had] sought
consultation with an assistance of a physician to provide him with
a prescription for a drug that Mr. Hall would self-administer to
precipitate his instant death when he reache[d] the point where
he [was] convinced that his only alternative [was] to experience a
prolonged period of useless suffering. 142

As to Dr. McIver, the court found that
[He was] willing to exercise his professional skill and judgment to
consult with Mr. Hall and provide him with the assistance he re
quest[ed] to induce his death. Dr. McIver [had] examined and
consulted with Mr. Hall and concluded that he was fully compe
tent at all relevant times to make the request he [was] making,
and that his decision [was] not the result of mental illness or un
due influence by others.
138. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act was enjoined before going into effect.
See Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). On Appeal, the injunction was
removed. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. See, e.g., Foes of Assisted Suicide Lobby Senators, EUGENE REGISTER
GUARD, May 28,1997, at 3D.
140. Case No. CL-96-15-04-AF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997) (visited Feb. 13,
1997)<http://www.law.stetson.edulmciver.htm>.
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id. at 2-3.
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Dr. McIver's professional judgment [was] that it would be
medically appropriate and ethical to provide Mr. Hall with the
assistance he [had] request [ed] at some time in the near future.
However, Dr. McIver testified he [would] not provide Mr. Hall
with the assistance Mr. Hall request[ed] because of his fear of
prosecution by the State Attorney for "assisting self-murder."143

Faced with such compelling facts, the court granted the declar
atory and injunctive relief which was requested. In doing so, it took
full advantage of the ability of a court (as compared with a legisla
ture) to restrict its law-making to the facts of the case before it.
"Realizing that the matter before the court is one of first impres
sion and of public interest," the court said,
it is emphasized that the findings, decision, and direction in this
cause relate to these parties only-Mr. Hall, an adult, who is
mentally competent, terminally ill with AIDS, facing a certain
and agonizing death, and being under no influence, and Dr. Mc
Iver, who is willing to assist Mr. Hall under the circumstances of
this case. Although Dr. McIver, under this court's order, has the
right without fear of prosecution, to assist Mr. Hall, he cannot be
compelled to do SO.l44

On the other hand, in reaching its conclusion, the court made im
portant new law regarding physician-assisted suicide. Florida's Pri
vacy Amendment,145 which had been added to the State
Constitution in 1980, was held to extend constitutional protection to
prescription of lethal dosages of drugs for the purpose of achieving
physician-assistance in suicide. "Suicide," said the court,
may be defined as the premature ending of one's life, therefore,
in the strictest sense, disconnection from life support or withhold
ing of food and water are all forms of suicide. However, suicide
by the terminally ill by their refusal of life supporting or sus
taining treatment is constitutionally protected, while it is argued
that suicide with the assistance of a physician through the intro
duction of a death producing agent is not. Physicians are permit
ted to assist their terminal patients by disconnecting life support
or by prescribing medication to ease their starvation. Yet, medi
cation to produce a quick death, free of pain and protracted ag
ony, are prohibited. This is a difference without a distinction. In
those cases where a competent, terminal patient chooses to
hasten his death the State has little interest in preventing this
143. Id. at 4.
144. [d. at 11.
. 145. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23.
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type of suicide. It is clear that the State has little reason in forc
ing the prolongation of Mr. Hall's pain and suffering merely be
cause he takes medication to shorten his death instead of taking
medication to ease a longer dying period. The State's legitimate
concern cannot override Mr., Hall's interest in foreshortening his
existence by mere days.l46

McIver is presently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court,

and it is possible that the lower court's decision may be reversed.
However, this will not stop state courts from continuing to grant
relief to deserving plaintiffs in cases of overwhelming need for the
provision of physician-assisted suicide. Such cases are, after all, dif
ferent only in degree from the early cases which have been thought
of as establishing a right to refuse treatment. Quinlan, for example,
is not really a right to refuse treatment case. It is a right to be killed
or be assisted in suicide case. Unlike Jehovah's Witnesses, who re
ject blood transfusions (despite the fact that they want very much to
live) because they truly object to the blood transfusion on religious
grounds, the Quinlans had nothing against the use of ventilators as
a medical technique. If use of a ventilator had offered a chance of
restoring Karen to a sapient, cognitive state, the Quinlans would
ha.ve been glad to accept its use. The problem was that they de
cided that Karen would be better off dead than continuing to be
maintained in a vegetative state, and they saw discontinuance of the
ventilator as an appropriate and acceptable means for managing
her death. Similarly in Brophy, there was no principled objection
to artificial nutrition and hydration as such. The decision in that
case was not that Mr. Brophy would under no circumstances have
accepted artificial nutrition and hydration, it was that Mr. Brophy
would have preferred death over continued maintenance in a per
sistent vegetative state, and removing food and water seemed the
easy way to achieve that.
George Annas, who is himself a foe of legalization of physi
cian-assisted suicide, has, perhaps unbeknownst, provided us with
one scenario by means of which courts could legalize physician-as
sisted suicide through further development of common law. In
1994, Professor Annas suggested that there was no need for legisla
tion legalizing physician assistance in suicide by lethal prescription
because, if looked at in the appropriate light, such assistance in sui
cide is already legal. "Physicians legally can, and as a matter of
good medical practice should," says Annas, "supply prescriptions
146. McIver, <http://www.law.stetson.edulmciver.htm>.at 8.
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for potentially lethal drugs that have a legitimate medical use to
their terminally ill patients on request, if they believe that having
these drugs is likely to permit the patient to live better."147 Since
prescribing a lethal dose of drugs for the patient who wishes to have
it at the bedside for use at such time that he or she may decide to
commit suicide makes the patient "feel more secure ... and there
fore ... able to live better,"l48 the doctor who prescribes such
drugs commits no crime of aiding suicide. The physician's intent is
not to help the patient kill him or herself, it is just to make the
patient live better.
Annas's line of reasoning is one that I can easily envision being
adopted into the common law of the right to die by a state court
confronted by the appropriate compelling case. I also predict that
such principles, and others like them, will be adopted by our courts
of common law for the purpose of continuing the process of legaliz
ing physician-assisted suicide. So long as our state legislatures con
tinue to ignore the plight of patients who suffer and professionals
who place themselves needlessly at risk, we will continue to have to
rely upon our courts of common law to provide the necessary relief.

J.

147. George J. Annas, Death by Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331 N.
1240, 1241 (1994).
148. Id. at 1242.
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